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1 Introduction 
Barely three years after seceding from Sudan following five decades of armed struggle against 
systematic marginalisation and oppression1, South Sudan descended into a protracted civil war 
from 15 December 2013 when President Salva Kiir and Deputy President Riek Machar fell out. 
The signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 
on 17 August 2015 after almost two years of devastating conflict thus signalled hope for the 
beginning of the long process of reconciliation and social (re)construction in South Sudan. This 
hope was, however, short-lived when, barely eleven months after the signing of the Agreement, 
Kiir and Machar fell out again and the civil war continued. Again, the concerted efforts of the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, supported by the African Union (AU) and 
other international stakeholders, secured a recommitment to the 2015 Agreement by Kiir, 
Machar and a host of other splinter rebel groups on 12 September 2018 in the form of the 
Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-
Agreement).  
The conflict was characterised by widespread and systematic violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law possibly amounting to international crimes committed by all parties to the 
conflict, most of which have been painstakingly documented by multiple entities including the 
African Union Commission of Inquiry into South Sudan,2 the African Committee of Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,3 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
 
* Doctoral Researcher (University of Luxembourg) 
1 See John Garang, The Call for Democracy in Sudan (Kegan Paul 1992); Girma Kebbede, ‘Sudan: The North-
South Conflict in Historical Perspective’ (1997) 15 Contributions in Black Studies 15; Francis Mading Deng, 
‘Sudan’s Turbulent Road to Nationhood’ in Ricardo René Larémont (ed), Borders, nationalism, and the African 
state (Lynne Reiner 2005); Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, ‘South Sudan: A History of Political Domination - A 
Case of Self-Determination’ (19 November 1995) <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_machar.html> 
accessed 15 July 2019. 
2 ‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’ (2015) 
<http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final-report-of-the-african-union-commission-of-inquiry-on-south-sudan> 
accessed 10 July 2019. 
3 ‘Report on the Advocacy Mission to Assess the Situation of Children in South Sudan’ (African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 2014) <https://www.acerwc.africa/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Advocacy_Mission_South_Sudan_English_PAGES-ilovepdf-compressed.pdf>. 
  2 
Rights,4 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan,5 the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of internally Displaced Persons6 and civil society 
organisations. In order to deal with the legacy of the conflict, the R-Agreement provides a 
transitional justice roadmap for South Sudan which includes proposals for the creation of the 
Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (the Commission), the Compensation and 
Reparation Authority and the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (Hybrid Court). The objective of 
this paper is to examine the potential of the Commission to contribute towards sustainable 
transitional justice solutions in South Sudan, based on contemporary standards and practice of 
transitional justice. The paper adopts (i) a historical approach in order to understand the context 
of truth-seeking in South Sudan and history’s influence on the R-Agreement’s transitional 
justice provisions, and (ii) descriptive and analytical approaches in examining the proposed 
design and operation of the Commission. The paper also draws inspiration from truth-seeking 
experiences in other countries and explores possibilities for learning. Notably, South Sudan is 
still restive and as such, the analysis in this paper is set against the background of a society 
caught in the uncertain and ambiguous state between conflict and post-conflict. Therefore, 
while exploring its key objective, the paper also grapples with the complex question of when a 
society can be considered to be ‘ripe’7 for transitional justice intervention. 
2 Locating the ‘right to truth’ in international law 
2.1 The general obligation to respect and ensure rights and to provide effective remedy 
Violations committed during violent conflict generally fall within the purview of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law as these are often violations of 
international obligations of the concerned state arising from the state’s commitment to 
international human rights and humanitarian law instruments. Generally, international human 
rights instruments impose an obligation on state parties to respect and ensure the rights and 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed therein. Specifically, Article 2 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obligates a state party ‘to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.’ Similarly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) 
uses the phrase ‘to give effect’8 as well as the words ‘ensure’, ‘protect’ and ‘respect’ in its 
formulation of various rights and freedoms and in referring to the obligations of state parties. 
 
4 ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (United Nations Human Rights Council 
2015) A/HRC/28/49. 
5 ‘Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’ (United Nations Human Rights Council 2017) 
A/HRC/34/63; ‘Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’ (United Nations Human Rights 
Council 2018) A/HRC/37/71; ‘Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’ (United Nations 
Human Rights Council 2019) A/HRC/40/69. 
6 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons’ (United Nations Human 
Rights Council 2016) A/HRC/26/33/Add.3. 
7 Adapted from William Zartman’s theory of ripeness in conflict resolution (See for example William Zartman, 
‘Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula and Mediation’ in Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald (eds), 
Perspective on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations: The Panama Canal Treaties, the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the Cyprus Dispute, Negotiating Zimbabwe's Independence Foreign Service Institute, 
U.S. Department of State 1986). 
8 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art 1. 
  3 
The obligation to respect is of a negative character in that it requires the state itself to refrain 
from interfering with the enjoyment of guaranteed rights. In this regard, a state party will be 
considered to be in violation if any direct or indirect acts of commission and/or omission 
attributable to it through international law rules of attribution have resulted in the violation of 
guaranteed rights or fundamental freedoms.  
The obligation to ensure rights is of a positive character in that it requires state parties to take 
active steps in two distinct, but complementary ways.9 First, the state is obliged to take active 
and positive preventive (due diligence) measures to ensure that persons within its jurisdiction 
do not suffer from violations of the above rights from any foreseeable source. Anticipated here 
is an open-ended catalogue that envisions legislative measures and any other relevant measures 
that a state deems appropriate to protect people from such violations of their rights and 
freedoms. The second limb requires that the state takes positive measures to ensure that 
appropriate corrective measures are undertaken in the unfortunate event that violations of the 
above rights have occurred. These measures should be aimed at disclosing all the relevant facts 
of the circumstances occasioning the violation and entail an obligation to investigate the 
circumstances and to make known these facts to victims, survivors, families of victims and 
survivors and the general public.10 This positive obligation is further complemented and 
reinforced11 by the general understanding that a violation of a right or freedom imposes an 
obligation on the state to ensure that an effective remedy is availed to the aggrieved party in the 
form of, inter alia’ determination ‘by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority … of the state’,12 and to ensure the enforcement 
of such remedies. Specifically, therefore, the state is obligated to ensure that remedies are 
available to survivors and victims and their families. These remedial measures should be 
accessible and effective, with particular emphasis placed on administrative mechanisms for 
ensuring thorough, independent and impartial investigations of alleged violations; judicial 
justiciability of rights including bringing perpetrators to justice; and availability of reparation 
to affected individuals.13 Particularly important is the interpretation accorded by the Human 
Rights Committee in General Comment 31[80] to Article 2 of the ICCPR as entailing an 
obligation to investigate. This is important considering the fact that most violations in the 
context of transitional justice often amount to international crimes.  
The obligation to respect and ensure rights is not only owed to victims, survivors, their families 
and the general public. According to the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation in 
paragraph 4 of its General Comment 31[80], this obligation is an erga omnes obligation, that 
is, it is also owed by a state party to other state parties. The relevance of this interpretation in 
the context of transitional justice is that any state party to the relevant human rights instrument 
has a legitimate interest and right to call upon another state party in transition to prioritise 
transitional justice mechanisms aimed at accountability such as truth commissions, 
 
9 Human Rights Committee general comment 31[80] para 8. 
10 Human Rights Committee general comment 36 para 29. 
11 Human Rights Committee general comment 31[80] para 8. 
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 2(3). 
13 Human Rights Committee general comment 31[80] paras 15-19. 
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prosecutions and reparations. The paper also argues that by virtue of the obligations under 
Articles 1(3) and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations which call upon member states and 
the United Nations (UN) to achieve international cooperation in ensuring respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, all UN member states have an obligation to assist and 
cooperate with a member state in transition in its transitional justice efforts. It is perhaps based 
on the understanding of South Sudan’s obligations above as erga omnes obligations that the R-
Agreement emphasises a prominent place for the AU (as representative of the collective will 
of its 55 member states) in the implementation of its transitional justice chapter.  
Of course, this paper is alive to the fact that South Sudan is not a state party to the ICCPR. This 
raises the question of state succession to treaties in relation to South Sudan’s obligations vis-
à-vis its former status as a part of Sudan. The paper makes two points in this regard. First, the 
government of Sudan – comprising the semi-autonomous Southern Sudan administration and 
the Khartoum-based administration – was bound under the ICCPR and the African Charter 
during the interim period from 2005-2011 since Sudan was a state party to both instruments. 
Second, upon secession in 2011, South Sudan did not accede to the ICCPR. However, the paper 
finds persuasive General Comment 26 of the Human Rights Committee which argues that in 
order to avoid a protection gap where the protection previously existed, automatic state 
succession should apply to human rights treaties which codify principles fundamental to 
guaranteeing inherent human dignity, such as the ICCPR.14 This argument aside, and as already 
mentioned above, South Sudan is a state party to the African Charter which guarantees rights 
and fundamental freedoms similar to and more elaborate than those guaranteed by the ICCPR. 
Further, as a member of the UN and the AU, South Sudan is bound to promote the common 
purposes of these organisations which include promoting and protecting human and peoples’ 
rights.  
2.2 Ensuring the ‘right to truth’ 
Transitional justice mechanisms therefore ought to be designed to ensure that the question of 
accountability for violations is addressed in such a way that all possible cases are investigated; 
facts of the circumstances disclosed to victims, families and the public; perpetrators held 
accountable; reparation ensured for victims and their families; and measures put in place to 
provide safeguards against recurrence. In other words, the state owes a duty of truth to the 
relevant individual rights bearers (victims and survivors),15 victims’ families and the general 
public on the relevant circumstances of the violations. While the vindication of the right to 
truth can be said to have been pioneered by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American human 
rights system starting with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ first decision in 
Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (1988), it has only been expressly stated as such in one 
human rights instrument, the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
 
14 See also Judge Christopher Weeramantry’s separate opinion in Case Concerning Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) Preliminary 
Objections (11 July 1996) (1996) ICJ Reports 595 paras 645 - 655. 
15 Human Rights Committee general comment 31[80] para 9. 
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from Enforced Disappearance.16 However, the right is implied, in relation to other human rights 
violations not subject of the above convention, from provisions of a number of human rights 
instruments. For example, Article 9 of the African Charter on the right to receive information 
implies an obligation on the state to disclose the facts and particulars of human rights violations 
and can also be interpreted as ‘prohibit[ing] the destruction of State documentation that may 
shed light on the facts and circumstances pertaining to gross human rights violations … and 
impos[ing] a responsibility upon States to take measures to ensure the preservation of such 
documents and testimonies.’17 Further, the ‘right to truth’ has been vindicated in the ‘soft law’ 
of the UN in the form of resolutions of its various organs/bodies as well as in the jurisprudence 
of regional human rights bodies. The UN Secretary-General, for example defined the ‘right to 
truth’ as implying ‘knowing the full and complete truth about the violations and the events that 
transpired, their specific circumstances and who participated in them’.18 This entails all the 
relevant information concerning the cause and course of violation as well as the fate of the 
victims. The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) – continuing the work of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights (CHR) before it – and the UN General Assembly (GA) continue to further 
develop the precise parameters of this right. Notable in this regard is the GA’s 2005 Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law which emphasises the obligation to verify the facts of the violation and fully 
and publicly disclose the truth of the cause and circumstances;19 the CHR’s 2006 Study on the 
Right to Truth;20 and the HRC’s 2011 Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances21 which emphasises investigations to clarify the fate of the disappeared, return 
of the remains of the dead to their families, full access to information relevant to the 
disappearance, and protection and assistance of victims and witnesses. 
A number of other resolutions by the CHR, the HRC and the GA have also emphasised the 
importance of the right to truth in the promotion of human rights and the fight against 
impunity,22 and so has the work of Special Procedures, particularly the 2013 report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-
Recurrence.23 Another notable CHR document is the 2005 Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity which declares 
that the right is an ‘[i]nalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the 
perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through 
 
16 Article 24(2) of the convention provides that, ‘Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the 
circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of the 
disappeared person.’ 
17 ‘Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 2019) para 107. 
18 A/67/267, para 5. 
19 A/RES/60/147 (16 December 2005) paras 22 & 24. 
20 E/CN.4/2006/91. 
21 A/HRC/16/48. 
22 CHR Resolution 2005/66 (20 April 2005); HRC Resolutions 9/11 (24 September 2008), 12/12 (1 October 209) 
& 21/7 (27 September 2012); General Assembly Resolution 68/165 (18 December 2013). 
23 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-
Recurrence’ (United Nations Human Rights Council 2013) A/HRC/24/42. 
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massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes’.24 While this set of 
principles has not been formally adopted by the HRC or the GA, it continues to provide 
assertive guidance to stakeholders working on the right to truth.25 Consequently, the ‘right to 
truth’ is increasingly gaining prominence as a fundamental component of the body of 
international law. 
3 Seeking ‘truth’ in South Sudan: The proposed Commission for Truth, 
Reconciliation and Healing 
In recent years, truth commissions have gained popularity as mechanisms for the promotion of 
justice and reconciliation in post-conflict societies, with more than sixteen such commission 
established in Africa alone26 and several others across the globe.27 Some attribute this global 
surge in popularity in part to the ‘success’ of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
of South Africa,28 though the South African TRC was itself neither uncontroversial29 nor the 
first such commission.30 The R-Agreement mirrors this enthusiasm and loftily anticipates that 
the proposed Commission will spearhead healing and reconciliation at both local and national 
levels.31 Of course, this is not to say that the Commission is expected to be the ultimate 
conciliator. Rather, through its power to independently probe abuses over a defined period of 
time, the Commission is expected to unearth and lay basic historical ‘truths’ and provide a 
platform for the recognition of the harm caused to victims and for perpetrators to acknowledge 
their transgressions. Hopefully, this will lay a firm foundation upon which the long process of 
reconciliation can build.32  
3.1 Striving for local ownership and continental learning 
The proposed membership and methodology of the Commission seeks to coherently fuse local 
identity with continental learning. Indeed, the African Union Transitional Justice Policy 
emphasises the principles of (i) national and local ownership of all aspects of the transitional 
justice process as fundamental to ‘ensur[ing] that TJ processes are aligned to local needs and 
aspirations, enhance[ing] a common understanding of a shared vision, and maximi[sing] public 
 
24 E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, principle 2. 
25 See for example Frank Haldemann and Thomas Unger (eds), The United Nations Principles to Combat 
Impunity: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2018). 
26 ‘Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (n 17) para 44. 
27 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (2nd 
edn, Routledge 2011). 
28 Christopher K. Connolly, ‘Living on the Past: The Role of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies and 
the Case Study of Northern Ireland’ (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 401, 402. 
29 See for example Mahmood Mamdani, ‘The Truth According to the TRC’ in Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi An-
Na’im (eds), The Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice (Zed Books 2000); Tshepo Madlingozi, 
‘Taking Stock of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 20 Years Later: No Truth, No 
Reconciliation and No Justice’ (3rd International Colloquium, Instituto Humanitas, UNISINOS, Brazil, 16 
September 2015). 
30 See Priscilla B. Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study’ (1994) 16 Human 
Rights Quarterly 597. 
31 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 2015 art 5.2.2.3.8. 
32 Christopher K. Connolly (n 28) 411; ‘Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ 
(n 17) para 42. 
  7 
support and ownership’,33 and (ii) African leadership of transitional justice processes in African 
states as fundamental to ‘ensur[ing] that the priorities and oversight of the implementation of 
the [transitional justice] processes remain the responsibility of African governments.’34 For a 
truth commission to achieve at least relative success, it is essential that nationals of the 
concerned society identify with the commission as a home-grown initiative.35 To promote such 
local buy-in and to ensure independence and credibility of the commission, the process of 
constituting the commission is key, and this process calls for transparency and public 
participation. Lack of public participation in the establishment of a truth commission would 
most likely mean that the commission lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This partly 
explains the unsuccessful examples of El Slavador and Haiti whose commissions had an all-
foreign and majority-foreign membership respectively.36  
Four of the Commission’s seven commissioners, one being the chairperson, are to be South 
Sudanese nationals while the other three are to be nationals of other African countries.37 
Majority South Sudanese membership emphasises a home-grown and responsive process 
spearheaded by South Sudanese with deep knowledge and understanding of the cultural and 
historical context as well as particular experiential appreciation of the course and effect of the 
conflict. The other African commissioners on the Commission should ideally bring vital 
context-sensitive experience from across the continent from which the process can learn, while 
also ensuring a reasonable level of impartiality. This is an endorsement of the AU’s guiding 
principles of African solidarity, Pan-Africanism and homegrown solutions to challenges facing 
the African continent,38 and of African leadership in transitional justice processes on the 
continent.39 This endorsement is further evidenced by the R-Agreement’s requirement that the 
three commissioners from other African countries must be nominated in consultation with the 
AU and the UN.40 
In order to broaden national acceptability of the individual members of the Commission, the 
Executive is required to seek and receive Parliament’s approval of all the nominees, nationals 
and non-nationals alike.41 Empowering the government to nominate all members of the 
Commission signifies respect for the sovereignty of South Sudan. Further, since Parliament is 
considered as representative of the people, parliamentary approval symbolises acceptance of 
the nominees by the people of South Sudan. Of course, parliamentary approval is sometimes 
susceptible to political considerations and is therefore not a guarantee of the professional and 
personal integrity of a commission’s members. A stark example of this was the case of the 
chairperson of the Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission whose suitability was 
 
33 ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy’ (African Union 2019) EX.CL/1145(XXXIV) paras 28–32. 
34 ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy’ (n 33) paras 24–27. 
35 Juan E. Méndez, ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 255, 268–269. 
36 Juan E. Méndez (n 35) 268–269. 
37 R-Agreement art 5.2.3.2. 
38 Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15 (2001) (entered into force 26 May 2001) 
preamble, arts 3(a) & (d) & 4(k). 
39 ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy’ (n 33) paras 24–27. 
40 R-Agreement art 5.2.3.3. 
41 R-Agreement art 5.2.3.3. 
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challenged in the courts, though unsuccessfully, even after being approved by parliament.42 
Parliamentary approval is nevertheless a necessary democratic process and can be an effective 
guarantor of integrity and competence especially if undertaken without undue political 
influence or considerations. 
Beyond composition, particular emphasis is placed on securing public acceptance of the 
Commission’s work. Past ‘truth and reconciliation’ efforts in South Sudan have suffered from 
exclusion and lack of public participation and ownership and this significantly contributed to 
the disintegration of the South Sudanese society leading to the civil conflict from 2013. For 
instance, while the Presidential Committee for Community Peace, Reconciliation and 
Tolerance in Jonglei State launched by the government in 201243 had reasonable input from 
community members, its work was restricted to Jonglei State which was hit hardest by inter-
ethnic conflicts and was therefore not a nation-wide initiative. Further, even though it 
completed its work before the outbreak of the civil conflict in 2013, its recommendations are 
yet to be implemented.44 Another attempt to launch a healing and reconciliation initiative 
spearheaded by Angelina Teny, a government minister at the time and spouse to Riek Machar, 
failed as it was not a government-driven initiative, but rather a Machar family project widely 
suspected to be for political scheming.45 Discomfort over Machar’s role in the events of 1991, 
highlighted in the next section, that left some of the deepest scars in South Sudanese society 
could also have been a factor. The first nationwide government initiative, National 
Reconciliation Committee for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation created in 2013, was also 
unable to fully commence operations since the war broke out shortly after its creation.46  
It is therefore refreshing that the R-Agreement seeks rectify to this particular error of past 
initiatives by recognising the importance of societal ownership of the reconciliation process 
and obligating the government to consult stakeholders and the public on the form and design 
of the Commission’s enabling legislation.47 Additionally, the Commission is obligated to 
regularly engage the people in its activities through sensitisation programmes and a user-
friendly system of constant feedback. The aim is legislation and methodology that reflect the 
people’s lived experiences and that are responsive to their needs for reconciliation and healing. 
Indeed, the UN and the AU recognise the centrality of public participation to the success of 
such a process.48 Consequently, the government launched the Technical Committee for the 
establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing on 15 December 2016 
and the Committee has since launched countrywide consultations on the form and design on 
 
42 Republic v. Truth Justice & Reconciliation Commission & another ex-parte Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 
Others [2011] eKLR Miscellanous Application 470 0f 2009; Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission v The 
Chief Justice and Bethwel Kiplagat [2012] eKLR JR. Case No. 7 of 2012. 
43 John Ashworth, ‘The Attempts of Dialogue in Sudan’ in Pernille Rieker and Henrik Thune (eds), Dialogue and 
Conflict Resolution: Potential and Limits (Ashgate) 177. 
44 ‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’ (n 2) para 920. 
45 ‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’ (n 2) paras 914–915. 
46 ‘Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’ (n 2) para 920. 
47 R-Agreement art 5.2.1.3. 
48 ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies’ (United Nations 2004) S/2004/616 paras 16 & 51; ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy’ (n 33) 
paras 19, 33, 39, 46 & 55. 
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the Commission’s constitutive legislation and to sensitise the populace on the Commission’s 
intended mandate.49 
The Commission is also obligated to incorporate appropriate traditional mechanisms, practices 
and processes in its work.50 Indeed, the African Union Transitional Justice Policy recognises 
as the recognition, adaptation and use of local alternative and traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms to address transitional justice needs as ‘benchmarks and standards for successful 
African traditional justice mechanisms’.51 These are understood to mean ‘the local processes, 
including rituals, which communities use for adjudicating disputes and for restoring the loss 
caused through violence in accordance with established community-based norms and 
practices.’52 By so providing, the R-Agreement recognises the fact that the South Sudanese 
people have widely-recognised and respected traditional dispute resolution mechanisms which 
to a considerable extent could ensure amicable reconciliation if given the necessary official 
backing of the Commission. In fact, traditional mechanisms have widely been used to resolve 
disputes across South Sudan due to the scarcity, incapacity or unavailability of formal judicial 
structures.53 However, as the provision expressly provides and as the African Union 
Transitional Justice Policy cautions, this should be restricted to appropriate circumstances 
where such traditional mechanisms will not undermine the proper purpose of truth, 
reconciliation and healing and only as far as these mechanisms uphold international human 
rights norms and standards.  
3.2 Scope of the Commission’s mandate 
3.2.1 Subject matter and personal jurisdiction 
The Commission’s subject matter, territorial and personal jurisdictions are broad and largely 
well-defined. This entails examining human rights abuses and violations in all their 
manifestations, abuse of power and violations of the rule of law against any person in South 
Sudan be they citizens or not.54 This examination targets direct and indirect responsibility of 
state or non-state actors or agents. Further, the Commission is expected to examine course as 
well as cause of the conflict and incidental matters.55 Indeed, truth commissions should aim at 
unearthing the truth whatever that may be.56 This ‘unearthing’ is only logically possible if the 
 
49 UNDP, ‘Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Launches Consultations for the Creation of the 
Commission on Truth, Reconciliation and Healing in South Sudan’ (14 May 2018)  
<http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/ministry-of-justice-and-
constitutional-affairs-launches-consulta.html> accessed 20 July. 2019. 
50 R-Agreement arts 5.2.1.5 & 5.2.2.3.9. 
51 ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy’ (n 33) paras 56–59. 
52 ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy’ (n 33) para 18. 
53 David K. Deng and Rens Willems, ‘Expanding the Reach of Justice and Accountability in South Sudan’ (April 
2016) 9–11 
<http://www.upeace.nl/cp/uploads/downloadsprojecten/Expanding%20the%20Reach%20of%20Justice%20and
%20Accountability%20-%20Policy%20Brief.pdf> accessed 1 July 2019. 
54 R-Agreement art 5.2.2.1. 
55 R-Agreement art 5.2.2.1. 
56 Priscilla B. Hayner (n 27) 24–27; See also United Nations Updated Set of Principles for the Protection of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (8 February 2005) E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. 
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commission has jurisdiction over such an expansive range of abuses and persons. This is 
particularly significant because the South Sudan conflict is complex and involves multiple 
actors with responsibility structures ranging from defined to fuzzy. Coming at a time when the 
field of transitional justice’s traditional focus on so-called civil and political rights at the 
expense of so-called socio-economic and cultural rights is increasingly being challenged,57 this 
broad and expansive subject matter jurisdiction designed to ensure that all violations are 
covered regardless of who committed them or their nature is particularly timely. It enables the 
Commission to have what the African Union’s Transitional Justice Policy considers a ‘holistic 
and transformational’ approach, that is, an approach ‘that considers the particular context and 
cultural nuances of affected societies, as well as the gender, generational, ethno-cultural, socio-
economic and development dimensions of both peace and justice’58  and targets, among others, 
root causes, socio-economic rights violations, marginalisation and systematic exclusion. As 
observed by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), ‘from the 
perspective of the African Charter, violations of socioeconomic rights and peoples’ rights are 
of significant interest in establishing a full account of the violations and the corrective measures 
to be adopted’.59 Of course, there is a risk that such an expansive subject matter jurisdiction 
risks presenting the Commission as a panacea and creating unattainable expectations. 
However, if sagaciously and expertly exercised, this expansive mandate can enable a country 
like South Sudan that ‘grapple[s] with the issues of destruction of sources of livelihood and 
socioeconomic infrastructure; exclusion and marginalisation of groups; uneven distribution of 
resources; ethnic and regional disparities; and systemic corruption’60 to holistically address its 
past (and present)  
3.2.2 Temporal jurisdiction 
However, of concern is the Commission’s temporal jurisdiction which covers the period from 
July 2005 to the time of the R-Agreement’s signature, 12 September 2018.61 As I have 
highlighted elsewhere, South Sudan’s woes can be traced to events before 2005, many of which 
remain unaddressed to this day and which have and continue to significantly impact relations 
within South Sudan.62 While the five-decade Sudan civil war was between the Khartoum-based 
government and resistance movements in the South (and West), the resistance movement in 
the South was not always a cohesive whole. A few examples are relevant to the truth-seeking 
process in South Sudan today. 1991 marked a turning point in intra-South relations when 
‘separatist’ ideologues led by Riek Machar staged an internal rebellion against the perceived 
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Rights?’ in Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 
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58 ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy’ (n 33) paras 9–10 & 19. 
59 ‘Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (n 17) para 49. 
60 ‘Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (n 17) para 49. 
61 R-Agreement art 5.2.2.3.1. 
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‘unitary’ ideologues, in the process provoking ethnic passions between Nuer and Dinka ethnic 
groups and gruesomely massacring Dinka combatants and civilians in Twic East and Bor.63 
Confrontations continued throughout the 1990s with Machar temporarily aligning with 
Khartoum in 1997, only to rejoin the Southern cause in 2002 towards the end of the civil war.  
This internal rebellion ‘sowed deep distrust among Southern communities as Machar’s actions 
were considered a Nuer betrayal of the Southern cause.’64 Earlier disagreements in the 1970s 
and early 1980s during the movement’s infancy, and later clashes between various Southern 
factions65 also compounded intra-South acrimony. Also noteworthy is that people in Southern 
garrison towns under Sudanese army control such as Juba, Malakal, Yei and Wau were often 
victims of attacks by the resistance movement who considered these towns and their people as 
legitimate military targets.66 
While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 effectively ended hostilities 
between the Sudanese government and the Southern resistance movements under the umbrella 
of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), it was very silent on the 
question of redress for atrocities committed during the Sudan civil war, and specifically those 
committed by Southerners against Southerners.67 The CPA effectively brought the internal 
rivalries, unease, tensions, suspicion, mistrust and bitterness of the Southerners ‘under one 
roof’ without providing a road-map for honestly engaging with them. The new nation’s survival 
depended on how it engaged with its painful past with the North as well as relations amongst 
its own peoples. In other words, South Sudan could only move forward as a nation built upon 
a solid foundation of respect for the dignity of its people if it confronted both North-South and 
intra-South human rights violations committed during the five-decade conflict. Because the 
CPA did not provide a road-map for addressing these pre-2005 events, they simmered below 
the surface and served as a catalyst for the conflict that broke out in 2013.68 
The Commission’s restricted temporal jurisdiction means that the Commission may not be able 
to address some historical causes and significant events69 thereby only addressing symptoms 
rather than causes. Faced with a similar time restriction, the Kenya Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission creatively interpreted its mandate to enable it interrogate 
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connected antecedent events and was therefore able to highlight colonial-era atrocities 
committed before independence on 12 December 196370 which was the official cut-off date set 
by its constitutive legislation.71 This could possibly be one way for the Commission to 
circumvent this lower-limit temporal limitation imposed by the R-Agreement in order to 
examine significant events and atrocities committed by Southerners against Southerners pre-
2005. This paper argues that by defining the Commission’s inquiry mandate to include ‘any 
other connected or incidental matters’,72 the R-Agreement in fact already provides the legal 
basis for such interpretation. However, concerning atrocities committed by the Sudanese 
government against Southerners during the Sudan civil war, the Commission may face legal 
and practical difficulties examining these since Sudan and South Sudan are now two sovereign 
states. However, since these atrocities were committed when these states were a single 
sovereign entity and since their effects linger on in intra-South and South-North relations, it 
would perhaps be prudent for South Sudan and Sudan to explore a joint mechanism similar to 
the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship that was jointly established 
by Indonesia and Timor-Leste in 2005.73 
The ceiling date of 12 September 2018 imposed by the R-Agreement also robs the Commission 
of the opportunity to examine occurrences after this date. While the Agreement anticipated a 
complete end to hostilities when it was signed on 12 September 2018, this has not quite been 
the case as low-intensity violence resulting in further violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law continues to be reported in some areas.74 Considering the abuses committed 
after 12 September 2018, South Sudan’s reconciliation process would be incomplete if the 
truth-seeking process were to be restricted to events before this date as provided in the R-
Agreement. Such a process would only serve to trivialise or ignore the whole ‘truth’ which is 
necessary for the success of a reconciliation process.75 It would have been a better compromise 
and perhaps a deterrent measure to fix this ceiling to the end of the transition period, as the R-
Agreement has indeed done with the Hybrid Court,76 in order to cover any potential violations 
after the signing of the R-Agreement and most importantly, to deter further violations. Possibly, 
the Commission could interpret its mandate broadly to include examining all events (before 
and after) that are connected or have significant bearing upon the events occurring during the 
restricted timeline of the R-Agreement. While not entirely uncontroversial, this would enable 
the Commission to interrogate relevant events after 12 September 2018.  
Finally, the R-Agreement requires the Commission to complete its work three months to the 
end of the transition.77 Considering the depth and breadth of the divisions in South Sudan and 
of the South Sudan conflict and its historical context, and given the precarious security situation 
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and logistical challenges prevailing in South Sudan, this period is grossly short and 
unrealistic.78 It is also no longer practical to expect the Commission to adhere to this timeline 
considering the fact that one year after the R-Agreement was signed, the Commission is yet to 
be established. Further, the R-Agreement expects that the timetable and exact timeframes for 
the Commission’s output will be determined by the anticipated legislation.79 While this allows 
for necessary flexibility, it also opens up possibilities for vested interests to use their legislative 
and political influence to manipulate the Commission’s timetable. There is therefore a risk that 
the Commission may lack sufficient time to conduct thorough examinations thereby 
undermining the concept of genuine reconciliation. As separately observed by the AU and the 
ACHPR, transitional justice is a ‘journey’80 rather than an event which should ultimately not 
only confront past abuses of human and peoples’ rights, but also facilitate ‘building of a just, 
democratic and inclusive political future for all’ South Sudanese81 and ‘achieve transition to 
the future of justice, equality and dignity’.82 This understanding of transitional justice should 
prevail in the Commission’s understanding and interpretation of its mandate in order to allow 
for a temporal mandate broad enough to address root causes, but not too wide as to make the 
Commission’s work impossible.  
3.3 Utility(?) of the Commission’s recommendations 
The Commission is empowered to make a wide range of recommendations including conflict 
prevention mechanisms and necessary reform of legal frameworks and institutions to deter 
repetition of human rights violations.83 The Commission is also empowered to make 
recommendations on remedial measures, specifically compensation and reparations.84 Truth 
commissions generally provide strong foundations for much-needed institutional reforms that 
may be the fulcrum upon which sustainable peace revolves.85 However, this depends on a 
number of considerations including how targeted the Commission’s recommendations are, the 
legal weight to be attached to the Commission’s report and consequently the impact thereof. 
Notably, however, the R-Agreement is silent on the binding nature of the Commission’s 
recommendations, and the implementation of its recommendations on compensation and 
reparations is subject to endorsement by Parliament.86 In the end, the Commission’s 
recommendations can very easily be ignored by the government. Further, remedial power rests 
with Parliament rather than the Commission and this raises concern as to the usefulness of the 
process if it cannot independently yield compensatory and other remedies. This deficiency can 
be mitigated, at least to some extent, by incorporating in the anticipated legislation a well-
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defined mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of Commission 
recommendations. 
3.4 The legal relationship between the Commission and the Hybrid Court 
In contexts such as South Sudan where multiple transitional justice mechanisms are envisioned, 
it is particularly important to have a clear strategy for handling issues of timing, sequencing 
and balancing of transitional justice objectives of the different mechanisms.87 Ideally, the 
various transitional justice mechanisms should be ‘comprehensively planned and 
complementarily organized’ in such a manner that they ‘endeavour to mutually reinforce, and 
ensure the complementarity of the objectives of peace and reconciliation on the one hand and 
justice and accountability as well as inclusive development on the other’.88 In fact, experience 
has shown that with a well-defined framework, the two mechanisms can work together in a 
beneficial and complementary manner89 in order to address transitional justice needs that 
neither mechanism can genuinely and sustainably address single-handedly, as the Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone experiences have shown.90 Without such framework, however, friction and 
tension are bound to arise. 
The Commission and the Hybrid Court have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct in-depth 
investigations and inquiries on violations over the period 15 December 2013 - 12 September 
2018.91 This in itself is not a problem since the Commission is a political institution offering 
political solutions while the Hybrid Court is a judicial institution offering legal solutions in 
accordance with international criminal law. However, the R-Agreement does not provide a 
framework for interaction thereby potentially setting the Commission and the Hybrid Court on 
a collision course. The experience of Sierra Leone shows the risks of not clarifying this 
relationship from the onset.92 The question arose whether persons indicted by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone could also testify before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra 
Leone. The trial chamber asserted in Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga Norman93 and Prosecutor v 
Augustine Gbao94 that the court had exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the accused persons 
and that to allow them to testify before the commission would undermine the court’s autonomy 
and jeopardise the right to presumption of innocence. On appeal, however, the Appeals 
Chamber disagreed, holding that the existence of the two mechanisms was based on the 
principle of complementarity which calls for a harmonious and practical balance between 
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criminal prosecution and the need for truth and reconciliation.95 Therefore, the accused persons 
could testify before the commission as long as the procedure for taking testimony upheld the 
integrity of the court process. While this appears to be a sound position, it may not always be 
obvious especially if the enabling instrument does not clearly spell out this relationship, as is 
the case with the R-Agreement. By requiring the government to enact implementing legislation 
for the transitional justice institutions, Article 5.1 of the R-Agreement provides the government 
with an opportunity through the anticipated legislation to provide a clear framework governing 
the legal relationship between the Commission and the Hybrid Court. 
4 Conclusion: Is South Sudan ‘ripe’ for a truth commission?  
Active hostilities make fully-fledged transitional justice mechanisms difficult to implement. In 
other words, during active hostilities, the situation may not necessarily be ‘ripe for transitional 
justice’ and any movement towards implementing transitional justice mechanisms may only 
be partially successful, if at all. South Sudan is emerging from a very protracted and complex 
violent conflict with multiple actors and multiple allegiances, and tensions therefore remain 
high. In fact, fighting is actually still ongoing in some remote areas across the country albeit 
sporadically and with less intensity.96 This complexity of the conflict may understandably give 
the impression that the country is not ‘ripe’ for transitional justice. However, while full-fledged 
establishment of all three transitional justice mechanisms envisioned in the R-Agreement may 
present practical challenges at this point, failure to make any movement towards their 
establishment further entrenches intransigence among the warring parties and exacerbates the 
suffering of civilians and the disintegration of South Sudanese society. This paper argues that 
preparatory steps can be commenced in anticipation of a ‘ripe’ moment. In fact, the positions 
of the UN and AU as articulated in the 2010 Guidance Note of the Secretary General on the 
United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (UN Guidance Note) and the 2019 African 
Union Transitional Justice Policy is that where prevailing security and political conditions do 
not permit for effective transitional justice measures, at the very least, the foundation for future 
mechanisms should nonetheless be laid and encouraged through a range of preparatory 
processes. The paper argues that South Sudan should move forward at the very least with the 
preparatory processes in order to coerce or encourage complete cessation of hostilities and to 
afford a degree of justice. This would include (i) preliminary documentation of the course and 
cause of the conflict and preserving the evidence in order to lay a foundation for the 
Commission and provide necessary material that the Commission will require for its work, and 
(ii) accelerating preparatory consultations for the enactment of the legislation necessary to 
establish the Commission.  
The devastation and ever-changing dynamics of violence in South Sudan underscore the 
urgency of professionally collecting and preserving evidence, a concern that has been raised 
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by civil society97 and the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (UN Commission) 
in its various reports. To its credit, the UN Human Rights Council extended the term of the UN 
Commission to March 2020 and, most importantly, expanded its mandate to enable it to ‘collect 
and preserve evidence of, and clarify responsibility for alleged gross violations and abuses of 
human rights and related crimes’ and to ‘make such information available also to all transitional 
justice mechanisms’.98 The UN Commission indeed continues to collect and preserve evidence 
of violations of human rights and humanitarian law in South Sudan.99 The Commission, once 
established, will be able to rely on the reports of the UN Commission, the African Union 
Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan and other agencies, at least as a basis for further 
investigation. Indeed, similar investigative reports in other situations have encouraged national 
action towards domestic accountability; informed UN Security Council action for international 
accountability; and informed the recommendations of truth commissions, reparations and 
institutional reform programmes.100 
The UN Guidance Note recognises ‘dialogue to assist national stakeholders to promote interest 
in and understanding of transitional justice measures’ as an activity that lays the foundation for 
transitional justice mechanisms. In the context of South Sudan, this process is currently 
possible on a number of fronts: civil society; faith-based groups; and government-led 
initiatives. Consultations can be conducted with a degree of safety with affected communities 
in refugee camps outside South Sudan and UN-protected internally displaced persons’ camps. 
In fact, there are already movements, albeit disjointed, towards such preparatory steps. Civil 
society and faith-based groups are already mobilising South Sudanese stakeholders within and 
outside the country to engage in consultative dialogue.101 There are also the parallel National 
Dialogue launched by President Kiir in May 2017 and the Technical Committee for the 
Formation of the Commission on Truth, Healing and Reconciliation established by the 
government. These efforts need to be urgently tapped into. More importantly, these efforts need 
to be harmonised and coordinated. Tapping into and harmonising these efforts will have the 
effect of: maintaining focus on the transitional justice obligations under the R-Agreement; 
providing a viable platform for awareness and constructive debate on possible designs for the 
Commission; laying the groundwork for the eventual creation of the Commission; and ensuring 
practicality. This process will lay the ground-work for the eventual creation of the proposed 
Commission and also hopefully pressurise parties to finally and completely ‘silence the guns’. 
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